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India, the second most populous country in the world, experienced
an accelerated decline in fertility during the 1980s. As a result, India's
total fertility rate (TFR) in 1993, 3.5 births per woman, is below the
level presumed in the population projections of the United Nations
and the World Bank. This favorable development has occurred as In
dia is attempting to reorient its family planning program to focus on
the reproductive health of women and the health and welfare of chil
dren. The method-specific targets for contraceptive acceptors assigned
to every grassroots health worker and the incentives offered to clients
for undergoing sterilization were abandoned in April 1996. 1
Against this background, this paper seeks to analyze the compo
nents of future population growth in India based on a series of hypo
thetical projections using alternative assumptions about the future
decline in fertility. Only one assumption is made about the pace of
mortality decline. The likely consequences of the prospective popula
tion growth and the policy options for accelerating fertility decline are
also discussed.

Population Growth in India Since Independence
At the time of its Independence in 1947, India already had a popula
tion of about 345 million. The eighth decennial census of 1951 counted
357 million people (excluding the state of Jammu and Kashmir,
where the census had not been conducted), making India the second
largest country in the world. 2 Since then, India's population has in
creased more than two and a half times, to nearly 930 million by
early 1996. J India remains behind China with respect to population
size, but according to the 1994 projections of the United Nations it
seems to be heading for the first rank by about 2045 (United Nations,
1995).
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, the rate of
population growth in India was modest and was affected by the out
breaks of epidemics and famines. An acceleration of the rate of popu
lation growth began after 1921, as a result of mortality decline in
response to effective control of plague, cholera, and other communi
cable diseases, and to improved famine management (see Cassen,
1978; Dyson, 1989; L. Visaria and P. Visaria, 1984).4 The death rate,
which ranged between 40 and 45 per 1,000 population prior to 1921,
declined to around 27-30 by 1951. Thereafter, mortality has declined
faster; the death rate fell below 10 per 1,000 by the early 1990s. 5 Life
expectancy at birth has risen from around 25 years during the period

1891-1921 to 32 years in the 1940s (Davis, 1951) and to nearly 60
years during 1991-96. 6 Infant mortality has also recorded a sharp
drop from an estimated 200-225 deaths per 1,000 live. births during
the 1940s (Coale and Hoover, 1958) to around 74 during 1993-94. 7
Although Indian fertility has never reached the level of some
African or Latin American countries, the birth rate had remained around
40—45 per 1,000 up to 1971. The average number of children bom to
an Indian couple was around 6. Since the early 1970s, fertility and
the birth rate have declined. The pace of fertility decline during 197193 has exceeded the expectations of many demographers, including
the authors of the population projections by the United Nations and
the World Bank.8 The birth rate has declined to below 29 per 1,000
and the total fertility rate to about 3.5 in 1993. The decline signifies a
more than 40 percent drop in fertility in less than 25 years. Fertility
decline has partly compensated for the drop in the death rate; as a
result, the average annual rate of natural increase in India has not
exceeded 2.25 percent during 1971-91. Since 1991, the rate of natu
ral increase has declined below 2.0 percent.
Despite the declines in fertility and the rate of natural increase,
the absolute annual increase in population is higher in India than in
any other country of the world. The Indian population has been
growing by over 17 million annually since 1988, whereas in China,
which has the world's largest population (exceeding 1.2 billion at the
end of 1995), the annual rate of natural increase is about 1.1 to 1.2
percent, and the absolute annual increment in population is lower
than in India.
In terms of growth, international migration from or to India is of
little consequence in relative terms. The rate of natural increase deter
mines the pace of population growth. Table 1 summarizes the evi
dence relating to the rate of population growth as well as the average
birth and death rates during successive intercensal decades. The rates
follow the typical pattern of demographic transition, with a decline in
the death rate preceding the fall in fertility and leading to an accelera
tion of the rate of natural increase.
The relatively high fertility until about 25-30 years ago has re
sulted in a young age structure. According to data from successive
censuses, the proportion of the population aged 0—14 years was stable
at around 41—42 percent up to 1971 but has declined to 39 percent in
198 1. 9 The age distribution data from the 1991 census are not yet
available, but according to the Sample Registration System (SRS) for
1990-92, the proportion of the population aged 0-14 has declined to

Table 1

Population statistics of India, 1901-91

Census
year

Total
population
(millions)

1901

238.4

1911

Crude birth
rate
(per l,000)a

Crude death
rate
(per l,000)a

Rate of
natural
increase

0.30

—

—

—

252.0

0,56

49.2

42.6

6.6

1921

251.2

-0.03

48.1

47.2

0.9

1931

278.9

L.06

46.2

36.3

9.9

1941

318.5

1.34

45.2

31.2

14.0

1951

361.0

1.26

39.9

27.4

12.5

1961

439.1

1,98

40.9

22.8

18.1

1971

54S.2

2.20

40.0

17.8

22.2

1981

683.3

2.24

37.8

15.4

22.4

1991

846.3

2.14

32.5

11.4

21.1

1991-94

—

—

29.0

9.6

19.4

Average
annual
growth rate

"Annual birth and death rates are for the preceding intercensal decade and are derived by the
reverse-survival method for 1901-51 and by the differencing method for 1951-71. For the
years 1971-94 the rates are based on the Sample Registration System.
Sources: Davis, 1951; Office of the Registrar General, New Delhi, Sample Registration Bulletin,
various issues.

a little over 36 percent (Table 2). However, the Indian age distribution
is still young with a broad base; as will be shown below, it implies a
large built-in momentum for continued growth over the next several
decades.
Table 2

Age distribution of the population of India, 1961-91

Based on census
Age group

1961

Based on SRS

1971

1981

1971

1981

1991

0-14

41.0

42.0

39.5

41.2

38.0

36.3

15-59

53.3

52.0

54.0

53.5

56.3

57.7

5.6

6.0

6.5

5.3

5.7

6.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

60+
All ages

Note: Columns may not add to 100 because of rounding.
Sources: Census volumes and successive volumes of the Sample Registration System,
published by the Office of the Registrar General, New Delhi.

Given India's size and heterogenous cultures, complex social
structure, and regional differences in the stage of economic develop
ment, the Indian demographic scene exhibits considerable diversity
among the constituent states of the federation. 10 Besides differences in
absolute size, the levels of fertility, mortality, urbanization, and indus
trialization vary substantially between states. The southern states of
Kerala and Tamil Nadu and the small state of Goa on the West Coast
have nearly completed the fertility transition; their fertility has
reached or is near the replacement level. On the other hand, the four
large northern states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, and Madhya
Pradesh, accounting for nearly 40 percent of the country's population,
had total fertility rates in 1991 ranging between 4.5 and 5.2. Regional
differences in death rates are relatively small; therefore the differen
tials in fertility largely account for the sizable inter-state differentials
in the growth rate of the population. These inter-state differentials
have political implications because they suggest changes in the share
of population in different regions and changes in their representation
in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament. Although the impli
cations of regional differences in population growth and age structure
are not discussed in this paper, they merit careful analysis.

Population Growth Under Alternative Projections
This section presents the application of a procedure for decomposing
the projected long-term population growth of India. This procedure
relies on a series of population projections with alternative assump
tions about rates of decline in fertility and a likely course of mortality
decline (see Annex for details).
A single mortality scenario has been used for all population pro
jections in this decomposition. It does not take account of an epi
demic of AIDS expected to engulf India within the next 5 to 10 years
and leading to a considerable rise in mortality. The initial estimates of
male and female life expectancy were 58.6 years for males and 59.0
years for females; they are based on the SRS life tables for 1988-92.
We have assumed that they have risen to 59.0 and 59.5 years for
males and females, respectively, by the time of the 1991 census.
The annual increase in life expectancy at birth is presumed to
continue at the recently observed level until the average length of life
reaches 65 years. Thereafter, the annual increments are expected to
slow down. The improvement is assumed to be higher for females
than for males, with maximum length of life projected to be 79 years

for males and 85 years for females, to be reached during 2056-61 and
2061—66, respectively. These values are taken from the "West" model
life tables of Coale and Demeny (1983).
To arrive at a decomposition of the factors contributing to future
population growth, alternative population projections have been
made with hypothetical assumptions about the course of fertility.
• Our standard projection extrapolates the recent trends in fertil
ity, such that fertility will reach the replacement level by 2016-21.
This implies a linear decline in TFR of 0.33 points per quinquennium.
The changes in preferences regarding family size implied in this pre
sumption are elucidated below.
• A second hypothetical projection attempts to elucidate the im
plications of meeting the "unmet need" for contraception, or elimi
nating the unwanted fertility of couples, so that women have only
those children they want. Our estimates of unwanted fertility or
unmet need are based on the National Family Health Survey (NFHS)
conducted in India during 1992-93. According to the NFHS, some
22.5 percent of births were unwanted (UPS, 1995, p. 197). n It is as
sumed that all unwanted births are eliminated in 1996-2001 by
strengthening the family planning program and widening its reach,
and by removing all social, economic, and psychological obstacles to
the practice of contraception. In addition to the decline in fertility
resulting from the removal of unwanted fertility, the secular decline
in wanted fertility is expected to continue because of changes in the
conditions influencing reproductive behavior. 12 The amount of de
cline in wanted fertility is presumed to be half of the fertility decline
during 1996-2001 under the standard projection. After 2001, fertility
is presumed to continue to decline at the "standard" pace, with the
replacement level of TFR reached in the quinquennium 2006—11.
• A third hypothetical projection seeks to estimate the contribu
tion of the momentum of population growth. It assumes that Indian
fertility will drop to the replacement level in 1997, and this level is
then expected to hold through the twenty-first century.
• A fourth projection illustrates the implications of fertility decline
continuing beyond the replacement level, as has happened in Kerala,
where the TFR has been below 2.1 since 1988, with levels of 1.7-1.8
during 1991-93. A TFR of 1.8 is postulated for the country as a whole
by 2021, and it is presumed to continue through the rest of the
twenty-first century.
We do not suggest that the second and third alternative courses of
fertility decline are realistic: unwanted fertility is unlikely to disappear

Figure 2 Projected crude birth and death rates and rate
of natural increase for 1991-21O1 under the standard
projection
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mentum of growth implicit in the young age distribution. High
wanted fertility and unwanted fertility each account for about 19 to
20 percent of the total expected growth.
In the projections discussed so far, population growth eventually
approaches zero and population size levels off. However, if belowreplacement fertility of 1.8 is attained by 2021 and remains unchanged
thereafter, the total population would peak at 1484 million during 2061—
66 and then begin to decline to 1293 million by 2101. Relative to the
Table 4 Factors underlying population growth according
to the standard projection, 1996-2101
Factor

Growth
(millions)

Percent
share

Total expected population growth

828

100.0

Unwanted fertility

154

18.6

High wanted fertility

169

20.4

Momentum of growth

505

61.0

standard projection, from an identical figure of 1222 million in 2016
the below-replacement projection would lead to a small difference of
12 million in 2021, rising to 122 million in 2051 and 464 million in
2101. Continued below-replacement fertility for about 78 years after
2023 would neutralize about 28 percent of the impact of the growth
momentum of population (141 million out of 505 million).

Consequences of Prospective Population Growth
Before considering the policy options suggested by the alternative
projections presented above, we discuss briefly some of the conse
quences of the considerable population growth likely to occur over
the next 50 or 100 years. There has been considerable debate among
economists about the implications of rapid population growth. It is
now argued that the adverse effects of population growth on the pace
of development can effectively be neutralized by proper policy initia
tives. Unsatisfactory outcomes are blamed more on the deficiencies of
social and economic policies than on population growth per se. The
received wisdom is now cautious in its articulation of the impact of
population growth on various determinants of economic growth (e.g..
National Research Council, 1986). However, it is difficult to believe
that even with the best and most effectively implemented policies to
promote economic growth, people would not be better off with
slower population growth and a smaller number of persons to share
the benefits of economic advancement. 13
As to the implications of prospective population growth, the criti
cal questions are whether the expected improvements in the health
and welfare of the population in the form of declining mortality could
be jeopardized because of the difficulties of feeding them and main
taining and improving the level of nutrition. From this point of view,
food production and employment (which would provide people with
the means to buy the necessities of life) appear to be the most critical
variables. The other two major issues are (a) the distribution of popu
lation between rural and urban areas and associated needs for invest
ments to ensure a basic infrastructure of civic amenities, and (b) the
problems of the aged. Let us look at each of these issues in turn.

Food production
Thanks partly to significant improvements in the technology of pro
duction in the 1960s and thereafter, food production in India has
more than matched population growth. Between 1951 and 1995, the
per capita daily availability of cereals and pulses together has risen at

an average annual rate of 1.2 grams (or 0.27 percent). Improved stor
age and the decline in the allowance necessary for seed requirements
are likely to have increased the foodgrains available for consumption.
Therefore, average caloric intake has almost certainly risen. 14 Also,
despite controversies about the extent of decline in the incidence of
poverty, the fact of such decline is not in dispute. While a large num
ber of people do not get a balanced diet, the extent of stark hunger is
almost certainly much smaller than is generally believed, and it is
mainly limited to a few states and certain months of the year.
Considerable scope remains for a further rise in yield rates and in
output per unit of land (Dyson, 1993). Therefore, except during years
of inadequate rainfall, India should be able to feed its growing popu
lation without any serious problem. 15 The spatial distribution of food
production, however, poses some difficulties of regional imbalances
because the improved technologies require assured water supply. 16
Recycling of water and technological progress in lowering the cost of desalinization of sea water might alleviate the water crisis that looms ahead
in several parts of the country. But the technology for the purpose is
likely to be capital-intensive and will require large investments.

Landholdings
A major consequence of continuing population growth will be a fur
ther decline in the average size of landholdings. Already, the progres
sive subdivision of familial landholdings among all sons on the death
of the father has meant that in the country as a whole, by 1992, al
most 72 percent of rural households owned less than 2.5 acres (or less
than 1.0 hectare) of land. Although the percentage of landless house
holds has not risen between 1982 and 1992, the share of small and
marginal holdings has increased. A rough extrapolation of the trend
observed between 1971 and 1992 leads to an estimate that the frac
tion of rural households with less than 2.5 acres of land will rise to
about 79 percent by 2002 and to 87 percent by 2012. Intensive culti
vation might make many of the small holdings viable. Yet, a large
majority of households with small holdings will have to diversify their
economic activities to include nonagricultural work in manufacturing
or services. A good program of skill improvement and retraining
would help to ease the process of adjustment.

Level and structure of employment
Evidence on the level and structure of employment over the past sev
eral decades shows no decline in the worker-population ratios and no
1O

rise in the incidence of unemployment as measured by the National
Sample Survey. The stability of the worker-population ratios seems to
reflect mainly the growth of informal-sector employment, particularly
in the nonagricultural sector. The share of the agricultural sector in
total employment has declined since the early 1970s, although more
slowly than was projected in 1961. During the 15 years between
1972-73 and 1987-88, the fraction of agricultural workers in the total
labor force has dropped from 74 to 65 percent. Nonagricultural em
ployment has risen at an average annual rate of 4.2 percent over this
period; the rates of growth of formal and informal employment have
been 2.2 and 4.9 percent, respectively (P. Visaria and Jacob, 1995).
The incidence of unemployment tends to be much higher among
high school graduates and those with higher education. The stock of
such persons has increased eightfold between 1961 and 1987-88 and
continues to grow much faster than the employment opportunities of
the type to which they aspire (P. Visaria and Minhas, 1991). The
growth of such opportunities has indeed slowed considerably and is
unlikely to increase in the years ahead, when public-sector and gov
ernment employment is more likely to contract than to expand.
Our standard population projection is used to estimate the likely
size of the total labor force aged 15 years and above during 19912031. It is assumed that the labor force participation rate for the age
group 15—19 will decline by about 15 percent over the 30 years begin
ning in 1991 because of rising high school attendance rates, but that
the rates for other age groups will remain unchanged. These are con
servative assumptions because the decline in mortality and the rise in
life expectancy are likely to raise the age up to which individuals will
remain physically and mentally fit to continue economic activities.
Also, declining fertility will relieve women of many chores of childrearing and household work.
According to our projections, the total labor force aged 1 5 and
older is likely to rise from 354 million in 1991 to 627 million by 2021
and 692 million by 2031. The average annual increments to the labor
force are apt to remain between 9.0 and 9.4 million through 2021 but
will decline to 6.5 million in the decade that follows. The rate of
growth of the labor force is estimated to decline from 2.3 percent
annually during 1991-2001 to 1.9 percent during 2001-11, 1.5 per
cent during 2011-21, and 1.0 percent during 2021-31. The slowing of
the rate of labor force growth will be a result of fertility decline, and
about 65 percent of the population aged 15 and older will continue to
constitute the labor force.

It is difficult to foresee whether and to what extent the prospec
tive labor force growth will add to the pool of the unemployed. The
economic reforms and the structural adjustment program adopted
since 1991 have altered the basic context of employment growth.
Because India seems unlikely to generate a significant number of jobs
in the public sector, a large proportion of the new entrants into the
work force will have to find employment as self-employed or casual
workers rather than as regular employees with assured income. The
growth of information technology promises to add considerably to the
opportunities for home-based contractual work. Trade unions are also
likely to feel the pressure to abandon their exclusive concern with the
interests of the already-employed irrespective of the costs likely to be
paid by those not currently employed and by the new entrants into
the labor force.
.....
The virtually inevitable rise in the proportion of rural households
with small and marginal landholdings is likely to accelerate the pace
of change in the nature of economic activities and the structure of ru
ral employment. The diversification of the rural employment struc
ture evident since the early 1970s is likely to continue, leading to a
decline in the share of the self-employed or of cultivators among agricul
tural workers and to a rise in the proportion of agricultural laborers
and casual workers. Rising levels of literacy and education in rural
India are also likely to encourage a continuation in the shift toward
nonagricultural employment.

Urbanization
The steady decline in the average size of landholdings and the associ
ated shrinking of work opportunities in agriculture could cause a siz
able outmigration from rural areas and a rise in the pace of
urbanization. In fact, however, the shift in employment structure
from agriculture to nonagriculture since the 1970s has been faster
than the process of urbanization. After nearly 45 years of planning for
industrialization through vigorous state intervention, the share of
urban population in the country was no more than 26 percent in
1991. The difficulties of adequate housing in India's urban centers
and the feasibility of commutation through relatively inexpensive
transportation between urban and rural areas seem to be responsible
for the slow pace of urbanization.
Projections by the United Nations postulate a slow urbanization
in India during 1990-2000 but with its pace accelerating subse
quently. The percentage of urban population is expected to grow from
25.5 to 28.6 percent during the 1990s and then to 33.8 percent in
12

2010, 41.3 percent in 2020, and 45.2 percent in 2025 (United Na
tions, 1993).
The number of urban residents was nearly 217 million in 1991. If
the UN projections are assumed to be valid, the urban population
according to our standard projection would increase to 289 million in
2001 and a staggering 605 million in 2026. The number of cities with
one million or more persons has grown from 12 in 1981 to 23 in
1991, accounting for nearly a third of the total urban population in
India. Even if they do not grow faster than the total urban popula
tion, these 23 cities will have about 96 million people by the year
2001 and more than 200 million by 2026.
Among the three major components of urban growth, the rate of
natural increase of population is unlikely to be a major factor contrib
uting to rapid urbanization in India. With the recent sharp decline in
the urban TFR to about 2.7 or 2.8 during 1990-93, and the associated
drop in the urban birth rate, the rate of natural increase in u rban In
dia has declined from 2.0 percent during 1981-85 to 1.7 percent dur
ing 1992-94. Quite likely, urban fertility will decline faster than rural,
and a further fall in the urban rate of natural increase seems probable.
After a time lag, however, the rural-urban differential in the rate of
natural increase will narrow.
The second component of urban growth is migration. In India, the
pace of net rural-to-urban migration in the years ahead is difficult to
predict. It is customary to think that if efforts to strengthen the infra
structure in rural areas succeed, migration may not accelerate. How
ever, the spread of the mass media, particularly television, can have
unforeseen effects, and with the growing awareness of differences in the
living conditions of towns and villages, the pace of rural-to-urban migra
tion can change considerably. Such an acceleration of migration may
well occur during the first quarter of the twenty-first century.
A significant reclassification of villages as towns also appears to be
a distinct possibility. With population growth, the size of many vil
lages having a population of 5,000 or more will rise; and with a likely
faster growth of nonagricultural employment, they might be reclassified as towns. Since all places with an urban form of local self-govern
ment are ipso facto classified by the Indian census as towns,
reclassification might become a major factor leading to urban growth and
urbanization. In this perspective, the UN estimate of the urban popu
lation of India in 2025 may not prove unduly high.
As to the third component of urban growth, the provision of civic
amenities and social and economic infrastructure in the large number
of new towns will pose a serious problem. The tendency for India's

13

urban population to concentrate in large towns or metropolitan areas
is unlikely to reverse itself in the years ahead. As a result, the acute
problems of the rehabilitation of large urban slums, prevention of the
growth of new slums, and ensuring adequate and well-maintained
amenities such as safe potable water, sewerage and drainage, reason
ably clean air, roads, public transportation, and basic health and edu
;
;cational services are likely to prove daunting. 17
The large investments necessary to meet the urban needs are
proving extremely difficult because of inefficient management, wide
spread corruption, and the evident unwillingness of the potential
beneficiaries to pay a reasonable cost for the services. The prospective
population growth will accentuate these difficulties.

Problems of the aged
The number of persons aged 65 years and older through 2051 will
depend on the survival rates or the level of mortality experienced by
persons already bom. It will not be affected by the pace of fertility de
cline. All of our population projections indicate a steady increase in
both the absolute number of people above age 65 and their propor
tion in the total population. According to all of our projections, their
number will increase from 32 million in 1991 to 64 million by 2011,
105 million by 2026, and 236 million by 2051. Various problems likely
to be faced by this age group merit careful consideration and plan
ning. We simply allude to them here.
Almost 90 percent of persons aged 60 and older live with a
spouse, child, grandchild, or other relative—in short, the kin group.
The latter try to meet the physical, emotional, and financial needs of
parents or other elderly relatives. This system of care is facing increas
ing stress in the wake of urbanization and the growth of individual
ism, particularly in cases where children have emigrated. The decline
in fertility will reduce the number of .siblings who can share the re
sponsibility of looking after elderly parents or grandparents.
The number of specialized institutions for meeting the needs of
the aged is small, and the facilities they provide are generally inad
equate and unsatisfactory (Shah, 1993). It is widely held that instead
of emulating the example of Western welfare states, India must build
on the strengths of its institutions to tackle the problems of the aged.
The role of the state can be limited to taking care of the destitute who
have no alternative source of support. Yet, a substantial increase in
state financing of the care of the aged is essential, and the need for it
will grow in the years ahead.
14

Policy Implications and Recommendations
The following policy initiatives are essential to eliminate unwanted
fertility and unmet need for family planning, to accelerate the ongo
ing decline in wanted fertility, and to reduce population momentum:
(1) Providing high-quality family planning services with due at
tention to reproductive and child health;
(2) Reducing infant and child mortality;
(3) Raising the level of female literacy and education;
(4) Eliminating son preference; and
(5) Creating conditions that can help to raise the age at marriage.

Providing high-quality family planning services
Improving the quality and reach of the family planning program is
likely to be the most effective means of reducing unwanted fertility,
which is predicted to account for about 19 percent of population growth
up to 2101. If unwanted fertility could be eliminated, the prospective
population growth over the next 105 years would be reduced by
around 154 million.
Over its long history, the Indian family planning program has
moved away from the original goals articulated in the Draft Outline of
the First Five Year Plan. At that time, family planning was envisaged
as "a step toward improvement of health, particularly that of mothers
and children." This was considered the immediate benefit of the pro
gram, and its effect on the rate of population growth was expected to
be manifest only "over a period of time" (India Family Planning Com
mission, 1951, pp. 206-207; see also P. Visaria and Chari, 1996). Un
fortunately, implementation of the family planning program took a
different turn in the early 1960s; and the quantitative targets relating
to the annual number of acceptors and of the birth rate to be attained
took center stage. The excesses of the emergency period of 1975-77
remind analysts of the perils of forcing the pace of social change, par
ticularly in sensitive personal matters such as reproduction. The sub
sequent concern in the early 1980s to reduce the emphasis on
sterilizations and to encourage the acceptance of reversible methods
again led to a stress on method-specific targets. It has resulted in pres
sures on program functionaries to falsify the data that were to be the
basis for monitoring and evaluating their performance and for sug
gesting corrective action. However, the government now seems ready
to revamp the program, restoring the emphasis on its basic goals. The
new policy shifts augur well for a major advance toward more effec
tive delivery of services to the people who need them the most.
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The revamped program must raise the quality of all the services
offered, including sterilizations. For non-terminal methods, the pro
gram functionaries must improve communication between providers
and clients about the possible discomfort and/or side effects, their se
riousness, and remedial action necessary to overcome them.
Intervals between births are quite long in India; over 60 percent
of births occur more than 24 months after the previous live birth (In
dia, Office of the Registrar General, 1996, p. 56). To lengthen such in
tervals further may not prove easy. Yet, about 3 to 4 percent of live
births occur within 10 to 12 months of the previous birth, and an
other 32 to 34 percent occur within 12 to 24 months after a birth.
Service providers can help to lengthen birth intervals in the latter
cases. The number of "mistimed births" can be minimized by promot
ing the use of non-terminal methods of contraception.
The NFHS data indicate that only 9 percent of women surveyed
wanted to have another child within two years after their previous
child. Some 21 percent of women with no children wanted to wait
two years before having their first child. This proportion more than
doubled to 54 percent among women with one child. The desire to
space was very strong among women who had fewer than three chil
dren (IIPS, 1995, p. 183). These findings pose a challenge to the fam
ily planning program in India, which must improve access to
reversible methods to satisfy the needs of a large segment of the
population wishing to space their births. The operations research and
management issues such as assured supply of contraceptives, good
quality of supplies, and proper counseling and follow-up services
could play an important role in strengthening the program.
Admittedly, promotion of the use of reversible methods of contra
ception to delay the first pregnancy has proved to be very difficult in
India. The pressure on young couples from the larger kin network to
prove their fecundity is great, especially in rural areas. 18 Several stud
ies report that while most young women would not like to conceive
immediately after marriage, they do not have an effective option or
the freedom to exercise that option. In the initial years after marriage,
women's ability to make decisions on their own is minimal; it im
proves after a child (particularly a son) is born.
Women who want to postpone the first birth also face the prob
lem of finding a suitable method of contraception. They receive little
or no support from their husbands and therefore cannot expect them
to use a male method such as condoms. The IUD is generally recom
mended only for women who have had at least one child. Oral pills
are, therefore, the only method available to these women. Counsel-

ing would be needed to promote the use of pills by young women.
The family planning program must ensure a dependable and continu
ous supply of pills and the availability of follow-up services and coun
seling in the event of a method failure. 19 Unless the program can
ensure these services, pills cannot be popularized on a large scale.
Urgent action is required to focus on various reproductive health
needs of both women and men. The services for treating reproductive
tract infections and sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/
AIDS, are at best rudimentary in the public sector and need to be aug
mented substantially. Although abortion has been legal in India since
1972, safe abortion is still not easily accessible to most women. The
treatment for infertility and sex education for adolescents have re
ceived only limited attention. It is necessary to strengthen these ser
vices in order to alleviate widespread suffering and ignorance.
With targets for specific methods of contraception removed as of
April 1996, an excellent opportunity exists to review and reorient the
activities of female health workers so as to raise their acceptability
and credibility in the villages where they work. Careful monitoring
and evaluation of some well-organized experiments would help to
determine the most effective approach and methodology. With requi
site inputs by a multi-disciplinary team, an environment of mutual
respect and trust could help to raise the effectiveness of the Indian
family planning program in hastening a decline in fertility.

Reducing infant and child mortality
A strong effort to lower infant and child mortality and to improve the
health and nutritional status of children and mothers must remain a
top priority of the Government of India and of society at large. This is
important because lower infant and child mortality will reduce
wanted fertility insofar as couples try to replace deceased children and
seek to insure against the loss of children (Bongaarts, 1990). A low
ering of wanted fertility is an important policy objective because the
excess of wanted fertility over the replacement level is expected to
account for about 20 percent of the prospective growth of population
up to 2101.
The example of Kerala with its low infant mortality rate of about
15 per 1,000 live births during 1990-94 illustrates the benefits of sub
stantially lowering infant and child mortality. According to the NFHS,
the wanted total fertility rate in Kerala was 1 .8, a little lower than the
estimated TFR of 2.0. The example also implies that reducing mortal
ity would help to lower wanted fertility, and it must receive high pri
ority among the policies to be pursued by the government and
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society. Of course, lowering mortality is a worthwhile goal per se, and
it has been a stated objective of India's plans for social and economic
.......
development since 1950. 20
A program for universal immunization of Indian children against
vaccine -preventable diseases and of pregnant women against tetanus
was launched only in the 1970s and was not implemented nationwide
until much later. It has been a controversial effort, with recurrent charges
from nongovernmental experts that it has led to a neglect of the goal of
providing basic primary health care to the needy. While these controver
sies continue, infant and child mortality has indeed declined in India
from about 133 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1975 to 74 in 1994.
Despite the recent improvement, infant and child mortality rates
in India are unduly high. A rapid decline in such mortality would
contribute to establishing the credibility of health personnel and of
the government in general. It would also enhance the acceptance of
the family planning program by those who have been hesitant to do
so. Kerala has demonstrated that it is possible to lower the infant
mortality rate below 20. Kerala's effort in this direction has been
aided by the concentration of its population in relatively large villages
and by its generally excellent road and communications networks.
The percentage of births delivered in an institution or attended by a
trained health professional during 1993 was 98 in Kerala, twice the
national average of 49 percent.21 Other Indian states can try to repli
cate Kerala's experience, but the wide dispersal of the rural popula
tion makes this a difficult task. According to the 1991 census, over 67
percent of Indian villages (some 587,000) had a population of less
than 1,000; they accounted for about 26 percent of the rural popula
tion. With a significant proportion of scheduled tribes in their popu
lation, the small villages have lower than average literacy rates, and
the delivery of health services to their inhabitants is quite difficult
(P. Visaria, 1996). An effective reorientation of the family planning
program to emphasize the delivery of basic health services to women
and children could make a considerable contribution to the wellbelng
of residents of these villages.

Raising the level of education among women
Raising women's level of literacy and education is also likely to help
lower wanted fertility to the replacement level or even below. Despite
faster increases in the literacy rates of women than in the rates for
men throughout the twentieth century, the Indian situation in this
respect remains unsatisfactory.
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The 1991 Census of India enumerated only 32 percent of women
as literate. The rural-urban gap is wide: 25 percent of rural women
compared to 54 percent of urban women were reported as literate.
The regional disparity is also large. In spite of the opening of co-edu
cational primary schools in almost all villages, it has not been possible
to ensure universal school attendance, especially among girls. Indian
educators and planners have long been debating how the demand for
girls' schooling and literacy can be created, but strong social and cul
tural norms against female education among certain segments of In
dian society have proven difficult to change. Illiterate parents often do
not perceive the value of educating their children. In the minds of
many Indians, education is expected to lead to a secure salaried job in
the government. The realization that such jobs are not easy to find,
despite the policy of setting aside a number of such positions for cer
tain backward castes, leads to widespread frustration.
According to the NFHS data on the level of wanted fertility by
education of women, total wanted fertility for the country as a whole
declined with a rise in the level of women's education. It was below
the replacement level (2.1) not only for high school graduates and
better-educated (1.8) but also for women who had completed middle
school (a little below 1.9). A review of the wanted total fertility rate
(WTFR) in different states indicates a similar pattern throughout the
country. Women with a high school or higher education reported a
WTFR of 2.1 in only three states, namely Bihar, Haryana, and Uttar
Pradesh; in all other states, their WTFR was between 1.4 and 2.0.
Even women who had completed middle school reported a WTFR of
2.1 or less in all but three states.
If these preferences remain stable, a rise in the levels of female
education to at least the middle school and preferably to high school
and beyond would reduce wanted fertility to below the replacement
level. With the expected further decline in mortality, the TFR could
drop significantly below replacement level. The goal of replacementlevel fertility seems within reach if all women are educated up to at
least the completion of middle school and the high level of infant and
child mortality is lowered.

Eliminating son preference
Parents' strong preference for bearing sons, reported by many studies
in India (e.g.. Das Gupta, 1987; Khan et al., 1989), has its roots in the
social mores and norms of Indian society and contributes to raising
both unwanted and wanted fertility. The desire for a son is often the
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mother of many daughters and leads to some unwanted fertility. It
could also keep wanted fertility above the replacement level.
The recent accelerated decline in fertility has occurred despite the
persistence of a strong son preference. The ORG surveys of 1980 and
1989 had indicated that most Indian couples prefer to have two sons
and one daughter (ORG, 1983, 1990). The NFHS data relating to
wanted fertility by sex of the child also indicate that the sex ratio of
wanted children is distinctly masculine (1.6 sons vs. 1.1 daughters).
However, the data on actual fertility and the sex composition of living
children indicate a somewhat different pattern. According to the
NFHS, 66 percent of currently married women who had one son and
one daughter did not desire any additional children (IIPS, 1995, p.
186). The four-district study undertaken in Gujarat state in 1989 re
ported a similar finding (L. Visaria, P. Visaria, and Jain, 1994).
There is widespread concern that son preference in India has
been leading to the sex-selective abortion of female fetuses. The sex
ratios of children aged 0-6 years, based on 1991 census data, are in
terpreted as suggesting the extensive use of this practice in certain
areas. Although the use of amniocentesis and sonography for detect
ing the sex of the fetus has been banned by law, it is virtually impos
sible to enforce such legislation.
The presence of son preference is a difficult issue to tackle in the
short run. If couples have a strong desire for a specific daughter-son
combination, they will continue to bear children even beyond the
total number of desired children until they achieve their goal. Mea
sures to weaken son preference are again related to improving the
status of girls and women through provision of educational and em
ployment opportunities. Public policies may play little role in improv
ing the status and autonomy of women, but a successful educational
drive to reduce and eventually eliminate the centuries-old son pref
erence would contribute to a fall in wanted fertility. Effective massmedia communication about the value of women for the family and
society and about alternative role models and avenues available for
them can help to improve the status of Indian women. 22
In urban India, there are some indications of parents becoming
less concerned about the sex of their children and more concerned
about the total number of children. The perceived high cost of invest
ment in the education and health of children who do not contribute
to the income flows of the family through participation in economic
activity probably alters the net value of children. A rise in parents'
aspirations for the quality of their children and the level of living that
they will eventually enjoy can influence the behavior of rural couples
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as well; as has indeed happened in states where total fertility has de
.
.
...
.
clined sharply.

Raising the age at marriage

. . .

The momentum for growth attributable to the young age distribution
of the Indian population is likely to account for nearly 61 percent of
prospective growth up to 2101. Even if wanted fertility does not de
cline, a rise in the mean age at marriage can raise the mean length of
each new generation and lower the level of fertility during the period
when the rise takes place.
Since about 1976, the legal minimum age at marriage is 18 years
for girls and 21 years for boys. Unfortunately, enforcement of the law
is difficult, especially in areas where there is a tradition of early mar
riage for girls. According to the SRS data, among the 44,000 girls in
the sampled areas who were married during 1993, some 22 percent
in rural areas and 14 percent in urban areas were married before the
age of 18. The mean age of girls at marriage was 19.6 (19.4 in rural
areas and 20.5 in urban areas; see India, Office of the Registrar Gen
eral, 1996, pp. 27-31). The age was 20 years or higher in Assam,
Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Orissa, Punjab, and Tamil Nadu. Age at
marriage was lowest in rural areas of Andhra Pradesh and in urban
areas of Rajasthan. It was below the national average in rural areas of
Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Uttar
Pradesh, and West Bengal.
At the national level, an increase in the marriage age of girls is
likely to be achieved by a further rise in the level of female education,
as there is a strong correlation between the number of years of schooling
and age at marriage. A decline in the incidence of arranged marriages
would also be important, but this cannot be brought about easily by
legislation. The social change necessary to alter centuries-old behavior
patterns includes strengthening the rule of law and promoting a feel
ing of safety and security of unmarried daughters. While a law to fur
ther raise the minimum age at marriage would be difficult to
implement, other socioeconomic changes can raise the age at mar
riage. Such changes are particularly essential in the states having ages
at marriage below the national average.

The Plausibility of Attaining Below-Replacement
Fertility
The hypothesis that below-replacement fertility will become a na
tional norm has gained support from the experience of Kerala in the
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1990s and the unexpectedly sharp decline in fertility in Tamil Nadu
during the 1980s. The TFR in Tamil Nadu dropped from 2.8 during
1986-88 to 2.3 during 1991-93 and was 2.1 in 1993. Zachariah
(1996) reports that the one-child family has become popular in Kerala,
although the NFHS does not confirm his impression. According to the
NFHS, only 2.7 percent of the ever-married women surveyed in
Kerala reported an ideal of one child (University of Kerala, 1995, p.
115). The average ideal number of children was 2.6 and the total
wanted fertility rate was 1.8, 10 percent below the TFR of 2.0 re
ported by the NFHS for the three years preceding the survey in 199293. In fact, ever-married women in Tamil Nadu reported the lowest
mean ideal number of children in the country, 2.1; and over 9 per
cent reported one child as ideal. In the country as a whole, only 3
percent of ever-married women reported one child as the ideal num
ber (IIPS, 1995, pp. 189-199).
Prima facie, it appears difficult to suggest that below-replacement
fertility could become a national norm in the near future. Yet, the
recent shifts in economic policy in India have released unprecedented
forces that could accelerate the fertility decline. Coupled with rising
aspirations for a better quality of life, a widespread recognition of the
high cost of rearing children, including providing for their education
and health needs, could indeed lower wanted fertility much faster
than seemed possible only five years ago. While China is the only
country to promote a one-child norm in order to ensure a better bal
ance between human and natural resources, many countries in Eu
rope have in fact reported a TFR between 1.3 and 1.8 for several years.
It could happen in India as well, particularly if the gap between aspi
rations and the actual standard of living remains high for a suffi
ciently large number of people and there are adequate examples also
of the feasibility of a successful entry into the world of relative com
fort and abundance (P. Visaria, 1995).

Summary and Conclusion
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This paper has decomposed the prospective population growth of In
dia between 1996 and 2101 into three components: (a) the effect of
the growth momentum built into the young age distribution of the
base population; (b) the high level of wanted fertility; and (c) the
unmet need for family planning reported by respondents to the Na
tional Family Health Survey, 1992-93.
The alternative projections outlined are predicated on the absence
of a catastrophic rise in or a slowing of the pace of decline in mortal-

ity, such as could occur through the widely feared AIDS epidemic
and/or the outbreak of virulent drug-resistant microbes. This optimis
tic scenario also assumes that India will expeditiously establish the in
frastructure required for the disposal of wastes, the harnessing of all
sources of scarce water, the provision of safe potable water to grow
ing populations in the large metropolitan centers, and the contain
ment of varied forms of environmental pollution.
Our standard projections also presume a continuation of the de
cline in fertility such that a total fertility rate of 2.1 is reached during
2016-21. These projections imply a growth of population on the or
der of 828 million, from about 929 million in 1996 to 1757 million in
2101.
Meeting all unmet need for family planning by 1998 would lower
the expected population of 2101 by 154 million, or about 19 percent.
A shift in emphasis toward the provision of high-quality services,
with appropriate counseling about different methods of contraception
rather than the achievement of quantitative targets for the number of
acceptors of different methods, would help to establish the credibility
of the Indian family planning program. Recent evidence of an accel
erated decline in fertility augurs well for such a shift in the approach
of the Indian program.
Simultaneously, efforts need to be mounted to lower the desired
number of children through a concerted drive to reduce infant and
child mortality, to raise the levels of literacy and education of Indian
women, and to eliminate the preference for sons. Education of
women, a worthwhile goal in itself, seems to hold the key to lower
ing high wanted fertility to below the replacement level. Lowering
wanted fertility would reduce long-term population growth by 169
million, or a little over 20 percent of the total.
Around three-fifths (61 percent) of the prospective population in
crease is attributable to the momentum of growth implicit in the
young age distribution of the Indian population. The means to slow
the momentum include delaying the age at marriage and prolonging
the mean length of a generation. While the mean age at marriage of
Indian women has risen to above 20 years during the early 1990s,
past experience suggests that legislation to raise the age at marriage is
difficult to enforce and is unlikely to be of much help in this area.
Educational efforts, such as those initiated in Tamil Nadu, might help
in this sphere of social engineering. Quite likely, raising the levels of
female education will promote the greater autonomy of Indian women,
enabling them to assert their right to choose their own husbands and
to decide the age when they should marry.
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The experiences of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Goa inspire optimism
that Indian fertility could drop below the replacement level. Such a
situation, if it persists for a sufficiently long time, might lead to an
eventual decline in the absolute size of the population. The implica
tions of such a scenario, outlined in our fourth projection, are not
easy to envisage but must receive some attention because fertility
decline generally appears to be irreversible.
Indian policymaking is currently at a crossroads in the wake of
indications of a faster than expected decline in fertility and the grow
ing climate of opinion both in the country and internationally against
method-specific targets for the number of persons to be enrolled as
contraceptive acceptors. As a result, the Ministry of Health and Fam
ily Welfare is keen to evolve alternative approaches to permit health
workers to deliver basic services for broadly defined reproductive and
child health needs throughout the country. The task is immense.
However, now that a large proportion of the Indian population recog
nizes the urgency of altering traditional reproductive behavior, high
priority can be given to meeting the unmet need for family planning,
lowering wanted fertility, and slowing the momentum of growth.

Annex
Assumptions Underlying Alternative Population
Projections
Various assumptions relating to our alternative population projections are
listed below.
Base population. The population enumerated by the 1991 census, with an
adjustment for the state of Jammu and Kashmir (where the census could not
be conducted), is taken as the base population. No adjustment has been
made for an estimated net undercount on the order of 1.8 percent {accord
ing to the post-enumeration check).
Age distribution. The age distribution of the population is not yet available
from the 1991 census (data are available for only five states). Therefore, the
average values of the age distributions reported for the population covered
by the Sample Registration System for 1990 and 1991 are assumed to be
valid for the population enumerated by the census. A priori, the SRS-based
age data are expected to be superior to those of the census, particularly as
related to children below age 10.
Mortality. According to the SRS-based life tables for 1988-92, the expec
tation of life at birth was 59 years for males and 59.4 years for females. These
values have been assumed to be valid for 1991. (Earlier, these same values
had been estimated for 1991-93.) Mortality is initially expected to decline at
a relatively faster rate (yielding an annual gain of 0.4 years for males and 0.5
years for females) until expectation of life at birth reaches 65 years. The rate
of decline in mortality is expected to slow thereafter to 0.3 and 0.4 years for
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males and females respectively, until life expectancy reaches 70 years. There
after, the annual increase is assumed to drop further to 0.25 years for males
and 0.3 years for females, with the peak values of life expectancy at birth
pegged at 79 years for males and 85 years for females.
The peak values of life expectancy have been selected because of the de
cision to use the "West" model life tables of Coale and Demeny. The pro
jected decline in mortality may turn out to be conservative if the rate of
economic development in India accelerates and the country is able to devote
a much higher level of resources to health and welfare; such a process may
be facilitated by a faster decline in fertility than has been experienced in the
past.
Fertility. The base period values of fertility are averages of the SRS esti
mates for 1990-92, which imply a total fertility rate of 3.67. This figure is
preferred over the estimate based on the National Family Health Survey
(NFHS) data relating to births during the three years preceding the survey;
the latter seems to underestimate the fertility level, particularly for ages 25 and
older. We do not believe that the SRS has overestimated the level of fertility.
Future trends in fertility are projected according to four alternative esti
mates:
(1) A standard projection assumes fertility decline to continue at the
rate observed during the two decades between 1971 and 1991. Fertility is pro
jected to decline at the average annual rate of 1.8 percent for the quinquennium
1991-96; the quinquennial decrement is held unchanged for the successive
quinquennia until replacement-level fertility of 2.1 is reached during 2016-21.
(2) A second projection assumes that the unmet need for family plan
ning reported by the NFHS will be met over the five years 1996-2001. Ac
cepting the NFHS estimate of unwanted fertility, we postulate a decline in
TFR on the order of 22.5 percent as a result of its elimination. Further, a
decline in wanted fertility is also expected to continue; if it constitutes half of
the past pace of fertility decline, the total decline in TFR during 1996-2001
is assumed to be about 27 percent, and the TFR is expected to reach 2.44 by
2001 and the replacement level of 2.1 by 2006.
(3) A third projection aiming to illustrate the momentum of growth
built into the age distribution assumes a decline in TFR to the replacement
level of 2.1 almost immediately, i.e. during 1996-2001.
(4) An additional projection seeks to extend further the fertility decline
envisaged under the standard projection. It postulates that when controlled
fertility becomes virtually universal, the national TFR will drop below the re
placement level to 1.8 by 2021 and will continue at that level through the
end of the twenty-first century.
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Annex Table Assumptions about life expectancy and fertility built into
alternative population projections for India, and implied vital rates and
rates of natural increase
Life expectancy
at birth

Total fertility rate
assumed in alternative projections
No
Immediate
unwanted replacement
fertility
fertility

Belowreplacement
fertility by 2021

Period

Males Females

Standard
projection

1991-1996

60.00 60. 70

3. 50 ,

3. 50

3. 50

3 .50

1996-2001

62.00 63. 25

3. 17

2. 97

2. 10

3 .17

2001-2006

64.00 65. 55

2. 84

2. 27

2. 10

2 .84

2006-2011

65.75

67. 55

2. 51

2. 10

2. 10

2 .51

2011-2016

67.25

69. 55

2. 18

2. 10

2. 10

2 .18

2016-2021

68.75

71. 15

2. 10 J

2. 10

2. 10

1 .85

2021-2026

70.20

72. 65

2. 10

2. 10

2. 10

1 .80

2026-2031

71.45

74. 15

2. 10

2. 10

2. 10

1 .80

2031-2036

72.70 75. 65

2. 10

2. 10

2. 10

1 .80

2036-2041

73.95

77. 15

2. 10

2. 10

2. 10

1 .80

2041-2046

75.20 78. 65

2. 10

2. 10

2. 10

1 .80

2046-205 1

76.45 80. 15

2. 10

2. 10

2. 10

1 .80

2051-2056

77.70 81. 65

2. 10

2. 10

2. 10

1 .80

2056-2061

78.95

83. 15

2. 10

2. 10

2. 10

1 .80

2061-2066

79.00 84. 65

2. 10

2. 10

2. 10

1 .80

2066-2071

79.00 85. 00

2. 10

2. 10

2. 10

1 .80

2071-2076

79.00 85. 00

2. 10

2. 10

2. 10

1 .80

2076-2081

79.00 85. 00

2. 10

2. 10

2. 10

1 .80

2081-2086

79.00 85. 00

2. 10

2. 10

2. 10

1 .80

2086-2091

79.00 85. 00

2. 10

2. 10

2. 10

1 .80

2091-2096

79.00 85. 00

2. 10

2. 10

2. 10

1 .80

2096-2101

79.00 85. 00

2. 10

2. 10

2. 10

1 .80

26

Annex Table (continued)

• Mv,

Birth rates (per 1,000) assumed in alternative projections
Immediate
replacement
fertility

Belowreplacement
fertility by 2021

Period

Standard
projection

No
unwanted
fertility

1991-1996

28.35

28.35

23.65

28.35

1996-2001

25.53

23.99

17.61

25.53

2001-2006

22.62

18.36

17.95

22.62

...

2006-2011

19.95

17.25

18.03

19.95

.

2011-2016

17.56

17.54

17.44

17.56

2016-2021

17.00

17.29

16.08

15.09

2021-2026

16.71

16.20

14.82

14.54

2026-2031

16.02

14.97

14.24

14.09

2031-2036

15.13

14.25

14.03

13.36

2036-2041

14.38

13.96

13.81

12.50

2041-2046

13.93

13.76

13.47

11.74

2046-2051

13.65

13.46

13.13

11.25

2051-2056

13.39

13.12

12.89

10.93

2056-2061

13.09

12.84

12.75

10.63

2061-2066

12.82

12.67

12.66

10.33

2066-2071

12.64

12.58

12.60

10.08

2071-2076

12.54

12.54

12.55

9.91

2076-2081

12.51

12.51

12.50

9.83

2081-2086

12.49

12.49

12.46

9.80

2086-2091

12.47

12.46

12.45

9.78

2091-2096

12.46

12.44

12.44

9.77

2096-2101

12.44

12.44

12.45

9.75
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Annex Table (continued)

Death rates (per 1,000) assumed in alternative projections

Period

28

Standard
projection

No
unwanted
fertility

Immediate
replacement
fertility

Belowreplacement
fertility by 2021

1991-1996

9.44

9.44

9.15

9.44

1996-2001

8.65

8.57

8.34

8.65

2001-2006

8.03

7.90

8.16

8.03

2006-2011

7.62

7.69

8.05

7.62

2011-2016

7.44

7.69

8.03

7.44

2016-2021

7.44

7.72

8.07

7.41

2021-2026

7.49

7.76

8.19

7.53

2026-2031

7.63

7.94

8.47

7.77

2031-2036

7.86

8.26

8.86

8.11

2036-2041

8.08

8.54

9.18

8.42

2041-2046

8.31

8.81

9.48

8.76

2046-2051

8.55

9.08

9.80

9.15

2051-2056

8.74

9.30

10.04

9.49

2056-2061

8.84

9.42

10.17

9.76

2061-2066

9.29

9.91

10.66

10.44

2066-2071

10.12

10.78

11.45

10.56

2071-2076

10.99

11.63

11.69

12.79

2076-2081

11.56

11.94

11.41

13.73

2081-2086

11.84

11.68

11.52

14.34

2086-2091

11.88

11.60

11.78

14.66

2091-2096

11.78

11.77

12.00

14.72

2096-2101

11.81

11.98

12.04

14.58

Annex Table (continued)
Rates of natural increase (per 1,000) assumed
in alternative projections
Immediate
replacement
fertility

Belowreplacement
fertility by 2021

Period

Standard
projection

No
unwanted
fertility

1991-1996

18.92

18.92

14.50

18.92

1996-2001

16.88

15.41

9.26

16.88

2001-2006

14.58

10.46

9.79

14.58

2006-2011

12.33

. 9.57

9.97

12.33

2011-2016

10.12

9.85

9.40

10.12

2016-2021

9.50

9.57

8.01

7.68

2021-2026

9.22

8.45

6.64

7.01

2026-2031

8.39

7.03

5.77

6.32

2031-2036

7.27

5.99

5.17

5.26

2036-2041

6.30

5.42

4.63

4.08

2041-2046

5.62

4.95

3.98

2.98

2046-2051

5.10

4.38

3.33

2.11

2051-2056

4.65

3.83

2.85

2056-2061

4.26

3.43

2.58

0.87

2061-2066

3.53

2.76

2.00

-0.10

2066-2071

2.52

1.80

1.14

-1.49

2071-2076

1.56

0.91

0.86

-2.88

2076-2081

0.95

0.58

1.09

-3.90

2081-2086

0.65

0.80

0.95

-4.55

2086-2091

0.59

0.86

0.66

-4.88

2091-2096

0.68

0.67

0.44

-4.96

2096-2101

0.63

0.45

0.41

^1.83

.

.

1.44
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2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.
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The states are to decide whether to continue the incentives, i.e., compen
sation for time lost during the sterilization. The method-specific targets will
be replaced by alternative indicators of the performance of workers. A com
mittee has been set up to decide the manner in which these indicators are
to be monitored.
Including an estimate for Jammu and Kashmir, the population of India in
1961 was 361 million.
The Indian censuses are conducted generally during February of the year
ending with the digit 1 and have a reference date of 1 March. Our projec
tions therefore cover quinquennia ending on 1 March.
The influenza epidemic of 1918-19 is estimated to have killed almost 5 per
cent of the population of the Indian subcontinent, with a death toll of 16 to
20 million.
See various issues of the Sample Registration Bulletin published by the Office
of the Registrar General of India and also successive issues of Sample Regis
tration System: Fertility and Mortality Indicators, published annually since 1983.
The 1994 revision of the UN population projections estimated, for 1990-95,
a life expectancy at birth of 68.5 years for China (66.7 years for males and
70.4 years for females) and 60.4 years for India (60.3 for males and 60.4 for
females) (United Nations, 1995).
The infant mortality rate in India during the early 1990s is more than twice
the rate in China, where it has reportedly declined to around 30 in 1993
(World Bank, 1995, p. 214).
The Working Group on Population Policy, set up by the Planning Commis
sion in 1978, had projected a sharp decline in fertility in several states. It
had postulated a net reproduction rate (NRR) of 1 .0 for the country as a
whole by 1996 and for all states by 2001. However, while the mortality de
cline envisaged by the Working Group was considered likely and plausible,
its assumptions about the decline in fertility were regarded as overly opti
mistic by many social scientists, including the present authors.
As is well known, a stable level of fertility results in a stable or unchanging
age distribution, and high fertility produces a young age distribution. De
clines in mortality have only a minor effect on the age distribution (Coale,
1956).
India includes 26 states and 6 union territories. At the 1991 census, the
population of states ranged from a high of 139 million (Uttar Pradesh) to a
low of 404,000 (Sikkim). Union territories are administered by the central
government, and the national parliament legislates for them.
Interpreting stated fertility preferences as a measure of women's future
childbearing intentions has its limitations because the stated preferences
need not be held with conviction and can change. They can also be influ
enced by other members of the family and change accordingly. Neverthe
less, they serve the purpose of indicating the extent of unwanted fertility
and the need for family planning services.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

The wanted total fertility rate is calculated by excluding unwanted births
from the numerator of age-specific fertility rates (which are aggregated to
estimate the total fertility rate). A birth was considered unwanted if the
number of living children at the tune of conception was greater than or
equal to the ideal number of children, as reported by the respondent.
Women who gave a non-numeric response regarding the ideal number of
children were assumed to want all their births. The wanted fertility rate
represents the level of fertility that theoretically would result if all un
wanted births were prevented. See UPS, 1995, p. 197.
It is another matter, of course, whether couples themselves choose to en
joy the benefits of growth partly in the form of a larger family rather than
through a higher standard of living for a smaller number of children. The
critical question in this case remains whether and how far a choice has
been exercised after due consideration of the implications of alternative
courses of behavior.
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the per capita
daily supply of calories has risen from 1.997 in 1961-63 to 2,196 in 198789. See FAO, 1991, p. 238.
The percentage of gross sown area with irrigation facility has risen from an
average of 18 percent during 1951-66 to about 30 percent during 1981-92.
See Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, 1995, Table 13.
Large tracts of land in western and southern India without access to irriga
tion, generally called areas of dry farming, suffer a severe handicap in rais
ing their levels of production and income. In some areas, underground
water resources have been tapped so extensively through tubewells that
there is a fear of eventual depletion of the reservoir. The ingress of sea wa
ter near the coastal areas also threatens to become a serious problem.
The limited plague epidemic that began in Surat in 1994 created a serious
scare in India about the consequences of unregulated urban growth. How
ever, the quick subsidence of the epidemic has caused most policymakers to
overlook the severity of the problems faced by Indian cities. These problems
cannot be ignored for long in view of the imminent large additions to the
urban population.
This conclusion is based partly on the focus group discussions conducted in
rural areas of Gujarat by one of the authors. Similar qualitative studies in
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have reported the same impression.
In order to widen the choice of contraceptive methods, there have been
suggestions to include injectables such as Depo-Provera in the family plan
ning program. The government has been hesitant, largely because of ad
verse reactions from Indian feminists; but it has permitted private practitioners
and selected organizations to provide Depo-Provera.
Looking back, the relatively gradual decline in mortality in India has mod
erated the rise in the rate of natural increase. It has prevented the emer
gence of high growth rates such as the 2.5 percent seen in China during
1962-70 or 3.0 percent or more seen in countries such as Kenya and
Mexico for much longer periods of time.
31

21.
22.

The estimates are based on the SRS data for 1993. See India, Office of the
Registrar General, 1996.
Some have also argued that the institution of arranged marriage effectively
lowers the status of women because grooms and their families have greater
and even final say in the selection of brides. If this institution is weakened,
the status of women would rise.
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